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Prologue: “Americans know too little about the implementa-
tion of market-reform strategies in other countries,” says Alain
Enthoven, whose work on managed competition has formed the
underpinnings of the most recent health system reforms in the
Netherlands. In fact, he continues, “the Dutch are further
down the road to managed competition than we [Americans]
are.” In this paper four leading Dutch researchers bring the
American policy audience up to date on how managed competi-
tion is being implemented in their country. What is critical to
the sucess of reforms, both in the Netherlands and in the
United States, are risk adjustment mechanisms to prevent
cream skimming-that is, to prevent plans from selecting the
best health risks and avoiding those predicted to cost more. In a
health system bused on up-front capitation, health plans see it in
their interest to attract persons whose costs will not exceed the
amount paid to the plan for their care. Wynund van de Ven is a
professor of health insurance in the Department of Health Pol-
icy and Management at Erasmus University Rotterdum, in the
Netherlands. He holds a doctoral degree from the University of
Leiden and has served as a consultant to health system reform
efforts in New Zealand, Sweden, Russia, Poland, and Israel.
Rene van Vliet is associate professor of health economics in the
same department; his doctoral degree also is from Erasmus.
Erik van Borneveld is an assistant professor in the department,
where he focuses on the use of mandatory community-rated
high-risk pooling, which is another element of the risk-adjusted
capitation examined in this paper. Leida Lamers is also an assis-
tant professor in the depurtment. With a background in psychol-
ogy, Lamers focuses her research on the use of diagnostic infor-
mation as a potential risk adjuster.
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Abstract: The market-oriented health care reforms taking place in the Netherlands show a clear
resemblance to the proposals for managed competition in U.S. health care. In both countries good
risk adjustment mechanisms that prevent cream skimming-that is, that prevent plans fromselecting
the best health risks-are critical to the success of the reforms. In this paper we present an overview
of the Dutch reforms and of our research concerning risk-adjusted capitation payments. Although we
are optimistic about the technical possibilities for solving the problem of cream skimming, the
implementation of good risk-adjusted capitation is a long-term challenge.
The Dutch government and parliament decided in 1988 to radicallyreform the health care system. Regulated competition among insur-ers as well as among providers is a crucial element of the reforms. The
Dutch model could be considered the first attempt at nationwide implemen-
tation of Alain Enthoven’s Consumer-Choice Health Plan.1 There are close
similarities between the proposed Dutch reforms and proposals for health
care reform in, for example, the United States, Russia, Israel, and Germany.
An important common element is that consumers may choose from among
competing health insurance plans, which are largely financed through
premium-replacing capitation payments.
A major technical problem is the development of risk-adjusted capita-
tion payments, which competing health insurers would receive from a
regulatory agency, such as a health alliance or a central fund, for each
member. The payment amount varies depending on the risk group to which
the insured person belongs. Risk-adjusted capitation payments either may
constitute the entire revenue for insurers or may be supplemented by
additional premiums. The payments are intended to provide competing
insurers with an incentive for efficiency. However, if the risk groups in
volved are too heterogeneous, insurers may engage in cream skimming, or
preferred risk selection. In so doing, insurers select so-called preferred risks,
that is, insured persons whom the insurer expects to be profitable, given the
system of capitation payments and given the regulations for setting addi-
tional premiums.2
Here we first give an overview of the proposed health care reforms in the
Netherlands and describe how since 1993 risk-adjusted capitation pay
ments have been implemented in the public health insurance system. Next
we review recent results of Dutch research on risk-adjusted capitation
payments and discuss whether cream skimming in a competitive health
insurance market can ever be prevented. Finally, we discuss the relevance
of our conclusions for other countries.
Health Care Reforms In The Netherlands
Compulsory health insurance and regulated competition. The Dutch
health care system is characterized by a high degree of detailed, direct
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government regulation of volume, planning, and prices and by a mixture of
several health insurance schemes. The failure of detailed government regu-
lation has prompted attempts at reform. Furthermore, the present health
insurance system has several problems, and incentives for efficiency are
lacking. The proposed system can best be characterized as a compulsory
health insurance system for the entire population based on regulated com-
petition. Direct government control over prices and productive capacities
will have to make way for regulated competition among insurers and among
health care providers. Price cartels and regional cartels that have emerged
from anticompetitive government regulation and self-regulation will be
broken down.
Central Fund. The benefit package of the compulsory health insurance
system will be broad, covering hospital care, physician services, drugs,
physical therapy, and some dental care.3 All persons will receive a subsidy
toward their compulsory health insurance premiums through one of the
competing insurers. The subsidy will come from a Central Fund, which is
filled with mandatory, income-dependent contributions paid through taxa-
tion. From the Central Fund the subsidy will go directly to the qualified
insurer chosen by the insured person. Qualified insurers must have an open
enrollment period once every two years and must follow other procompeti-
tive regulations. The subsidy per person is a risk-adjusted capitation pay-
ment that does not vary by insurer. The payment will be equal to the
predicted per capita costs within the risk group to which the insured person
belongs, minus a fixed amount. This fixed amount is the same for all
persons and will be about 10 percent of the average predicted per capita
costs of the compulsory health insurance. The deficit generated by this
deduction is filled by a community-rated premium paid by the insured
person directly to the insurer of choice. A community-rated premium
implies that an insurer is obliged to quote the same premium to all insured
persons who choose the same insurance option. Each insurer is free to set its
own premium. This premium will reflect the difference between capitation
payments and actual costs, thus creating an incentive for competing insur-
ers to be efficient.
Insurers as prudent buyers of care. Insurers are expected to function
as intermediaries between consumers and providers, To a great extent,
insurers and providers will be free to negotiate the conditions of contracts.
The benefit package of the compulsory health insurance system by law will
be described not in terms of institutions such as hospitals or health centers,
but rather in terms of types of care. Any supplier meeting certain quality
standards may provide these services, thus greatly increasing opportunities
for substitution of care. Insurers will be allowed to contract selectively with
providers and to offer different insurance options (as do, for instance,
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health maintenance organizations [HMOs], preferred provider organiza-
tions [PPOs], and traditional health insurers), provided that they cover all
of the types of care specified in the law. Consumers will be free to choose
from among different insurers. Premiums will reflect the efficiency and
cost-generating behavior of the contracted health care providers.
Past the point of no return. According to the government’s proposal,
the reforms were slated to be implemented by the end of 1994. When we
look at the two key elements of the proposed reforms-compulsory health
insurance and regulated competition–we may conclude, however, that at
the end of 1994 neither had been implemented. Nevertheless, in the early
1990s fundamental procompetitive changes in legislation have been
achieved, giving us ground to expect that the point of no return toward
regulated competition is past.4
One of these fundamental changes was the introduction in 1993 of
risk-adjusted capitation payments in the Dutch public health insurance
market. Simultaneously, this market was made potentially competitive by
giving each consumer a biennial choice of health plan. During the past fifty
years the sickness funds, which administer the public health insurance,
were fully reimbursed for all of the health care expenditures of their mem-
bers. In most regions there were only one or two sickness funds, so real
consumer choice did not exist. Now all twenty-six sickness funds are
working nationwide.5 As of 1994 the funds had the option to selectively
contract with providers and can offer different health plans to their mem-
bers (for example, with or without a deductible). Within a short period,
sickness funds were transformed from purely administrative bodies into
risk-bearing enterprises, although their risk is still restricted.
For 1993 and 1994 the risk-adjusted capitation payments are based solely
on age and sex. These risk adjusters, however, are much too crude. From an
earlier study we conclude that, roughly speaking, in a given year the 10
percent of the population with the highest health expenditures (for hospi-
tal care, physician services, and prescription drugs) have expenditures in (at
least) the next four years that are on average roughly double the per capita
expenditures within their age and sex category.6 Further, the healthier half
of the population– that is, those without expenditures for hospital or
specialist care or those without prescription drugs–have 25-40 percent
lower per capita expenditures in (at least) the next four years than the
average within their age and sex category. So, if the risk-adjusted capitation
payments are based only on age and sex, each sickness fund can easily
identify high- and low-risk persons simply by using its own claims records.
Blended payments. To reduce the disadvantages of risk groups that are
too heterogeneous, the Dutch government introduced a partial capitation
system. In 1993 and 1994 the sickness funds are responsible for only 2.5
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percent of the difference between their actual expenses and predicted
expenses based on age and sex. The remaining 97.5 percent is retrospec-
tively reimbursed. In essence, this boils down to a blended payment system,
as proposed by Joseph Newhouse, in which the weight on current expendi-
tures is 0.975 and the weight on age/ sex-predicted expenditures is 0.025.7
To reduce the weight on current expenditures, thereby increasing insurers’
financial incentive for efficiency, the risk adjustment formula needs to be
improved.
Empirical Research On Risk-Adjusted Capitation Payments
In one of our first studies on risk-adjusted capitation payments, we
concluded that the most promising risk adjusters are diagnostic information
related to prior utilization, disability, functional health status, and indica-
tors of chronic medical conditions.8 Here we review the main results of our
empirical research on these and other risk adjusters.
Diagnostic information related to prior hospitalizations. Arlene Ash
and colleagues have developed various variants of so-called diagnostic cost
groups (DCGs) and have used them as risk adjusters?9 The essence of DCGs
lies in the allocation of people to a restricted number of groups according to
diseases diagnosed during prior hospitalizations and incorporating this in-
formation in the risk-adjusted capitation payment model. Ash and col-
leagues tested the DCG adjusters on a database of U.S. Medicare-insured
persons, a population composed mainly of persons age sixty-five and older.
We applied the DCG adjusters to a database of about 200,000 persons in
the Netherlands, both aged and nonaged persons.10 The results were com-
parable to those found in the Ash study. The addition of DCG adjusters to
an age/ sex-based risk-adjusted capitation payment model is a clear im-
provement. The percentage of the variance in the annual spending of
individuals that was predicted for annual per capita spending more than
doubled (from 3.2 percent to 6.6 percent).11 The predictable future losses
that an insurer will incur on the 5 percent of persons with the highest costs
in a given year fell from 224 percent to 24 percent of the risk-adjusted
predicted expenditures (Exhibit 1).12
Although the DCG adjusters on average substantially diminish predict-
able profits and losses, these are not reduced to zero. The average loss of 26
percent for persons who in the base year had expenditures between 1 and
2,500 guilders (U.S.$1.80-$4,545) is primarily caused by the high losses
(74 percent) for persons with outpatient costs above 1,000 guilders
($1,818). This group likely contains a relatively large proportion of chroni-
cally ill persons who have had no hospitalization in the base year. The
average loss of 24 percent for persons who in the base year had expenditures
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Exhibit 1
Profits And Losses For Two Models Of Risk-Adjusted Capitation Payment
Source: R.C.J.A. van Vliet and W.P.M.M.van de Ven, “Capitation Payments Based on Prior Hospitalizations,”
Health Economics 2 (1993): 177-188, Table 4.
Notes: Profits and losses equal costs predicted on risk adjusters in the risk-adjusted capitation payment minus
actual costs. “Costs” refers to expenditures for hospital and specialist care. DCG is diagnostic cost group.
a Profit and loss of the next year as a percentage of costs predicted.
b No statistically significant difference between actual and predicted mean costs (two-sided t-test, p > 0.05).
above 2,500 guilders ($4,545) is nearly completely caused by the large losses
(about 250 percent of risk-adjusted capitation payments) on the 0.25 per-
cent of the population that had expenditures above 25,000 guilders
($45,455) in that year.13
Recipients of disability benefits. If risk-adjusted capitation payments
are based only on age and sex, it is profitable for an insurer to have as few
members who receive disability benefits as possible. We found that the
future losses for these disabled persons (about 6 percent of the population)
are 71 percent of the predicted expenditures based on age, sex, and region.14
In another study we found similar results: an average predictable loss of 93
percent of the predicted expenditures based on age and sex for persons who
are disabled and unable to work or are unemployed.15 Results from studies
in the United States also indicate that disabled and functionally impaired
persons have roughly twice the health care expenditures of those who are
unimpaired. 16 We agree with Newhouse that disability status seems like a
nearly ideal risk adjuster.17
Self-reported chronic conditions. In an earlier study we analyzed risk-
adjusted capitation payments in a database comprising some 20,000 respon-
dents from the Dutch Health Interview Survey (DHIS).18 In the basic
risk-adjusted capitation payment model we included age, sex, insurance
coverage, region, employment status, and family size as risk adjusters. This
126 HEALTH AFFAIRS | Winter 1994
model explained 3.2 percent of the variance in the imputed health care
costs of individuals. The addition of self-reported chronic conditions raised
this figure to 7.1 percent. Including number of physical impairments and
self-rated general health status raised the figure to 10.9 percent. Although
self-reported chronic conditions and perceived health status are powerful
predictors of health expenditures, they might not be ideal risk adjusters,
because they are vulnerable to manipulation.
Region and ZIP code. When considering region or ZIP code as a
potential risk adjuster, the question arises for which risk factors the risk-
adjusted capitation payment ideally should adjust: for differences in health
status only, or also for other cost-determining factors such as the price and
supply of health care? The adjusted average per capita cost (AAPCC)
capitation payment that U.S. HMOs receive for Medicare patients is de-
signed to represent the local per capita fee-for-service costs that would have
been spent if the Medicare recipient had remained in the fee-for-service
sector instead of enrolling in the HMO. Then an index of the regional
health expenditure level is a good risk adjuster. However, according to the
proposed Dutch health care reforms, risk-adjusted capitation payments
should take into account health status only, and not the price and supply of
health care in a region. These should be reflected in an insurer’s commu-
nity-rated premium. In that case, a regional cost index probably would do
more harm than good.
We used DHIS data to construct a regional health index.19 For a particu-
lar region, this is the ratio between expected costs in that region based on
age, sex, and available health indicators (chronic conditions, physical
impairments, and self-rated health status) on the one hand, and expected
costs based on age and sex alone on the other. Subdividing the Netherlands
into five regions by degree of urbanization yielded ratios ranging from 0.95
to 1.08. Adding such a regional health index to the risk adjusters of age and
sex makes the risk-adjusted capitation payments more in accordance with
the stated premises about such payments in the Netherlands. Although the
regional health index stems from sample data of perceived health status and
self-reported chronic conditions, its vulnerability to manipulation seems
acceptably low, at least for the next few years.
Consumer choice of a high- or low-option plan. In the proposed
Dutch reforms and also in U.S. proposals for managed competition, con-
sumers may choose between high-option and low-option health insurance
plans. In a low-option plan, the consumer has a higher deductible and pays
a lower premium than in a high-option plan. However, this consumer
choice may result in adverse selection; that is, high risks (those in poor
health) may choose the high-option plan, and low risks may choose the
low-option plan. Because of this, risk-adjusted capitation payments may
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overcompensate insurers for consumers choosing the low-option plan and
undercompensate for those choosing the high-option plan.
We estimated these effects on a panel database comprising both admin-
istrative and survey information for 14,000 privately insured persons.20 The
analysis was based on answers to the following question: “Would you like to
have a health insurance plan with a deductible if you got an appropriate
premium reduction?” All respondents had the same insurance coverage,
because the insurance company did not yet offer policies with deductibles.
In the year following the survey, average expenditures on hospital and
specialist care for those respondents who did not want a deductible (the
high-option group) were 57 percent higher than for those who preferred a
deductible (the low-option group). Because all respondents had the same
insurance coverage, moral hazard does not affect this difference.
An important question is the degree to which the adjusters used to
calculate risk-adjusted capitation payments can explain the 57 percent
difference. Exhibit 2 shows that the average over- and undercompensation
as a result of adverse selection can be greatly reduced. When we use all
available risk adjusters (that is, age, sex, supplementary insurance, region,
five health indicators, and prior costs), the average over- and under-
compensation is reduced by about 80 percent, compared with use of no
adjusters at all. Recent research shows that refined systems of risk adjust-
ment can do an even better job in predicting health care expenditures of
individuals.21 We therefore conclude that, given an appropriate set of
Exhibit 2
Over- And Undercompensation, Apart From Moral Hazard, For Consumers
Preferring A High-Option Or A Low-Option Health Plan
Risk adjuster
No adjuster
Age/ sex
Age/ sex plus region and
sumJementaw insurance
Percent of predicted costs in the year after choice a
Low-option planb High-option planc
24% -20%
16 -11
14 -1 0
Above, plus five health indicatorsd 8e -5 e
Above, plus last year’s costs 5’ -3 e
Source: W.P.M.M. van de Ven and R.C.J.A. van Vliet, “Consumer Information Surplus and Adverse Selection
in Competitive Health insurance Markets ,”Journal of Health Economics (forthcoming).
Notes: Over- and undercompensation equals predicted costs minus actual costs. “Costs” refers to expenditures for
hospital and specialist care.
a Over- and undercompensation as a percentage of predicted costs in the year after consumers express their choice
of health plans.
b 46 percent of respondents.
c 54 percent of respondents.
d Includes GP consultations, prescribed drugs, disability, days of illness, health change.
e Based on differences that are not statistically significant (p > 0.05).
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adjusters, there need not be any substantial over- or undercompensation as
a result of adverse selection when consumers have a choice of whether to
take a deductible (with a reduced premium) for a one-year health insurance
contract with otherwise identical benefits. However, so long as the risk-
adjusted capitation payment is based only on age, sex, and some other poor
adjusters, one might consider incorporating the consumer’s choice of a
high- or low-option plan in the risk-adjusted capitation payment, to elimi-
nate the under- and overcompensation that otherwise would take place.
Current Research On Risk-Adjusted Capitation
From the results of the empirical research outlined above, we conclude
that the following risk adjusters, alongside age and sex, can be considered
promising: diagnostic cost groups (based on prior hospitalization), disabil-
ity, regional health index, and, possibly, consumer choice of a high- or
low-option plan. Our findings so far inspired the following research projects
on which we are working now.
Multiyear diagnostic cost groups. We concluded from our analysis of
DCG adjusters that a major weakness was the high losses for the small group
of persons with the highest outpatient care expenditures in the base year.
We hypothesized that this group contains a relatively large proportion of
chronically ill persons who had no hospitalization in the base year. One way
to capture this group is to look at diagnostic information related to other
forms of prior utilization, for example, prescription drugs or outpatient
care.22 We are now exploring a different approach, namely, so-called multi-
year DCG adjusters. That is, we assign to each DCG adjuster not only a
weight for the next year, but also weights for a couple of years after that.
The rationale for this is twofold. First, a serious hospitalization in a given
year might induce predictably above average expenditures not only in the
year directly following but, possibly to a diminishing degree, also in years
after that (without necessarily resulting from a new hospitalization). Sec-
ond, by giving higher risk-adjusted capitation payments for people who
were hospitalized for certain diagnoses during one of the previous years
(instead of only during the past year), we increase the probability that an
insurer will receive an appropriate risk-adjusted capitation payment for
chronically ill patients,
Preliminary results with respect to multiyear DCGs are promising.23 We
analyzed a data set of about 50,000 persons, which contained expenditures
for hospital care, specialist care, dental care, physical therapy, and some
ancillary services over the period 1988-1991. We first calculated the risk-
adjusted capitation payment for each person for 1991 based on age, sex, and
indicators for disability status, employment status, and urbanization. The
RISK-ADJUSTED CAPITATION 129
predictable losses (that is, predicted costs based on the risk-adjusted capita-
tion payment adjusters minus actual costs) in 1991 for the 7 percent of
persons with the highest outpatient costs in 1988 would then be equal to 98
percent of their predicted costs based on the risk-adjusted capitation pay-
ment adjusters. The addition of a one-year DCG adjuster to the risk-
adjusted capitation payment formula reduced the predictable losses to 79
percent of the predicted costs. The addition of two-year and three-year
DCG adjusters further reduced this to 38 percent.
Mandatory communitycrated high-risk pooling. Another weakness of
the DCG adjusters is the large loss that we found for the small group of
persons who had expenditures above 25,000 guilders ($45,455) in the base
year. To solve this problem, we are analyzing a system of mandatory com-
munity-rated high-risk pooling. Under this scheme, each insurer would be
obliged to pool all (or some) expenditures of a specified percentage of its
insured persons (for example, 1 or 2 percent) and to pay to the pool a
premium that depends only on the size of the insurer’s portfolio. In advance
of each year, the insurer informs the pool which of its insured persons will
be pooled that year. The group of pooled members may change every year.
This high-risk pooling may take several forms. For example, it could apply
only to certain costs above a threshold, or to a certain percentage of those
costs, or to a combination.
The purpose of mandatory community-rated high-risk pooling is not to
reduce insurers’ financial risk or their probability of going bankrupt. This
might be done via voluntary risk-rated reinsurance or by solvency require-
ments from government. The purpose of mandatory community-rated high-
risk pooling, rather, is to reduce insurers’ incentive for cream skimming.
Insurers will pool only those persons for whom they expect to be highly
underpaid by the risk-adjusted capitation payments. If retrospectively it
turns out that an insured person has had extremely high expenditures, but
these high expenditures were unpredictable, cream skimming is not a
problem. Insurers should be compensated as little as possible for unpre-
dictably high outliers. It is the insurer’s job to deal with these uncertainties.
Because an insurer remains responsible for the costs of persons with unpre-
dictably high expenditures and because the group of pooled members is
relatively small, the latter may be “free riders” as far as the insurer’s man-
aged care activities are concerned.
There are clear analogies between mandatory community-rated high-risk
pooling and the high-risk pools in the United States. Major differences,
however, are that under mandatory community-rated high-risk pooling the
pooled members pay the same premium as others, they have the same
benefit package, and they are even unaware that their insurer has put them
in the pool.
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The results of preliminary empirical analyses with respect to mandatory
community-rated high-risk pooling are promising.24 We are now analyzing
a data set of hospital spending for about 73,000 persons. For the 1 percent
of persons with the highest costs in the base year, the actual expenditures
next year are about 500 percent above the predicted costs based on age and
sex. For the next 1 percent group (the ninety-ninth percentile) with high-
est costs in the base year, this percentage falls to about 200 percent above
predicted costs. These figures illustrate how mandatory community-rated
high-risk pooling for 1 percent of an insurer’s portfolio might reduce pre-
dictable losses in the case of risk-adjusted capitation payments based on age
and sex, if insurers select their pooled insured simply on the basis of the past
year’s costs. Insurers likely will have better predictors, so the above example
underestimates the potential reduction of predictable losses due to manda-
tory community-rated high-risk pooling. In the above example, about 11
percent of next year’s costs would be pooled.
An alternative to such risk pooling might be to retrospectively pool all
expenditures for the 1 percent of insured persons with the highest costs. In
that case, 42 percent of the costs would be pooled. However, the biggest
part of these costs would be unpredictably high; thus, cream skimming
would pose no problem, and pooling of these costs would be unnecessary.
Can Cream Skimming Be Prevented?
A crucial question for policymakers who are attempting health care
reform is whether a risk-adjusted capitation payment system, including its
regulatory scheme, can be set up in such a way that cream skimming is
prevented to a sufficient extent.
Risk-adjusted capitation payment formula. An effective way to pre-
vent cream skimming is to refine the risk-adjusted capitation payment
formula so that insurers cannot predict which insured persons will be
profitable or unprofitable. The maximum predictable variance among indi-
viduals in annual, short-term health care expenditures is estimated to be
around 15 percent and is unlikely to exceed 20 percent.25 But can regulators
ever achieve such a formula, and, if not, is predicting a lower percentage of
the predictable variance good enough?
In a paper published previously in Health Affairs, Newhouse concluded
that research so far shows that fully prospective risk adjustment formulae
predict only around 20 to 30 percent of the predictable variance.26 Further,
Newhouse believes that further research can yield only modest improve-
ment. He concluded that the amount of profit a plan can make by exploit-
ing its proprietary information on risk (that is, information available to the
insurer and not to the regulator) is a nonlinear function of the amount of
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that information and, from the point of view of the regulator, that the
nonlinearity is in exactly the wrong direction. In other words, although
additional relevant adjusters in the risk-adjusted capitation payment for-
mula will reduce an insurer’s maximum attainable profit from cream skim-
ming, the reduction of these profits increases with each additional percent-
age point of variance explained by the formula. In particular, the last
percentage point of variance explained has a much larger effect on profit
than the earlier changes have. Based on these arguments, Newhouse is
pessimistic about whether a satisfactorily working, fully prospective risk
adjustment formula is attainable. For the following reasons, however, we
are more optimistic.
First, Newhouse considers only a fully prospective risk adjustment for-
mula and so rules out measures of prior use as adjusters. However, besides
being dependent on various health status characteristics, an acceptable (at
least for now) risk-adjusted capitation payment also might depend on
diagnostic information related to prior hospitalization, use of prescription
drugs, or ambulatory care (ambulatory care groups, or ACG adjusters).27
These adjusters might predict an additional 20 to 30 percent of the predict-
able variance.
Second, the conclusion that a plan’s profit is a nonlinear function of its
proprietary information on risk is based on a theoretical analysis under the
assumption that the variance explained by the regulator’s adjusters is negli-
gibly small. However, in drawing conclusions Newhouse considers a vari-
ance explained by the regulator that approaches 100 percent of predictable
variance. It can be shown that at such levels the underlying assumption
results in an overestimation of the profit per enrollee of about 56 percent,
which in turn implies an overestimation of the nonlinearity.28 Whether the
remaining (non)linearity is acceptable remains open for discussion.
Third, when the regulator improves its risk adjustment formula, not only
will a health plan’s potential profits from cream skimming decrease, but also
the standard deviation of its profits will increase (up to a factor of three). As
a result, the plan’s uncertainty will increase about whether the selection of
a certain number of enrollees the plan thinks to be overpriced will indeed
yield a profit. Therefore, when the regulator improves the risk adjustment
mechanism, an insurer has to increase the minimum number of selected
enrollees to be quite sure that a selection strategy yields profits, not losses.
This will increase the costs of the selection strategy, reduce its probability
of success (because competitors may have the same strategy), and increase
the probability that the regulator detects the cream-skimming strategy.
Fourth, one has to take into account an insurer’s costs of cream skim-
ming, which are clearly not zero. Information is not free, and a bad reputa-
tion resulting from cream-skimming strategies, such as keeping patients
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from the highest-quality care, also is a cost to an insurer. Therefore, the
regulator does not need to have a “perfect” risk adjustment formula. In
theory, the risk-adjusted capitation payment formula should be refined to
such an extent that insurers expect the cost of cream skimming to exceed
its profits. By refining the risk-adjusted capitation payment formula, that is,
by making the risk groups more homogeneous, the cost of cream skimming
will increase-it becomes more difficult and therefore more costly to deter-
mine who are the preferred risks, and the process of cream skimming itself
would have to be more sophisticated, making it more expensive-while on
average the profits of cream skimming will fall, and the variation of ex-
pected profits will rise.29 Therefore, refining the capitation formula, on
balance, lowers cream skimming’s financial attractiveness to insurers. At
what level of refinement cream skimming will become financially unattrac-
tive to insurers remains an open question.
Fifth, if the regulator’s adjusters predict a substantial amount of predict-
able variance, one may wonder whether small health plans with, say,
25,000 or fewer members, indeed could obtain accurate information on the
(un)profitability of subgroups within the risk groups formed by the regula-
tor’s adjusters. Large insurers, which have more accurate information on
risk than small insurers have, might be reluctant to use this information for
cream skimming because they are more vulnerable than small insurers to
losing their reputation.
Sixth, given a fixed number of potential enrollees under the risk-adjusted
capitation payment scheme, cream skimming is a zero-sum game. One
insurer’s profits are another’s losses. Losers will have a strong financial
incentive to advise the regulator about potential improvements in the
risk-adjusted capitation payment formula. For example, the sickness fund in
Amsterdam, which under the current risk-adjusted capitation payment
formula incurs the largest losses per enrollee, is closely (and successfully!)
cooperating with the regulator to improve the formula. So even if there
exists an information asymmetry between regulator and insurers, losers will
have a natural incentive to reduce this asymmetry.
Finally, Newhouse uses “explained variance” as an indicator of “informa-
tion on risk.” Because explained variance is a quadratic function of pre-
dicted expenditures, whereas profit is a linear function of predicted expen-
ditures in the profitable population, it is not directly clear how to interpret
the nonlinear relation between a health plan’s “proprietary information on
risks” and “profits.” For example, the relation between the square root of
explained variance and profit appears to be linear. One may wonder
whether in this context explained variance is the most appropriate indica-
tor of “information on risk.”
Procompetitive regulation. Based on the arguments outlined above, we
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do not share Newhouse’s pessimism. Furthermore, to prevent cream skim-
ming we do not need a “perfect” risk-adjusted capitation payment formula.
The degree to which such a formula functions satisfactorily also depends on
the regulatory regime. Besides open enrollment, standardized benefits, and
all forms of mandatory community-rated high-risk pooling, the following
measures also might prevent cream skimming: risk-rated (instead of com-
munity-rated) premiums, qualification of insurance contracts, no direct
contact between an insurer’s sales representative and applicants during the
enrollment process, publication of results of consumer satisfaction surveys,
and ethical codes for insurers. 30 The regulator should constantly monitor
the behavior of insurers, and evaluate and periodically adjust and improve
the risk-adjusted capitation payment formula. Because of this, insurers’
uncertainty increases about which persons over time will be (un)profitable,
thereby lessening the use of long-term cream-skimming strategies.
Conclusions And Discussion
Market-oriented health care reform has emerged in the Netherlands over
the past few years that shows a clear resemblance to proposals for managed
competition in the U.S. health care system. As a result of the way risk-
adjusted capitation payments have been implemented, sickness funds have
hardly any financial incentive for efficiency. For this reason, government
has not given up its old regulatory tools for cost containment. Conse-
quently, government has not achieved one of the major goals of the health
care reforms: to share the responsibility for cost containment and efficiency
with other parties, especially insurers. Sickness funds, in turn, maintain
that it is unfair to give them financial responsibility if they lack the tools for
improving efficiency. This vicious circle can only be broken by the intro-
duction of a sufficiently refined system of risk-adjusted capitation payments
and an appropriate regulatory scheme. It is expected that in 1995 disability
and a regional health index will be introduced as additional risk adjusters.
The sickness funds are in favor of implementing a form of mandatory
community-rated high-risk pooling.
Reasons for optimism. In this paper we have presented an overview of
recent results of our research concerning risk-adjusted capitation payments.
Based on these results and other findings in the literature, we think that it
is technically possible to find a risk-adjusted capitation payment formula
that, although not “perfect,” can predict a substantial amount of predict-
able variance. A “perfect” formula is not necessary to prevent cream skim-
ming. We have mentioned several forms of procompetitive regulation that
can help to prevent cream skimming. In sum, we are optimistic about the
technical possibilities to prevent cream skimming in a competitive health
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insurance market.
Monopsonistic insurance market? Those who are not convinced of
the effectiveness of the potential solutions to the cream-skimming problem
may favor a combination of a monopsonistic market for health insurance
and a competitive provider market. However, the prevention of cream
skimming is also relevant for a competitive provider market, in which
competing groups of providers receive an ex ante determined capitation
payment to provide (or to purchase) a defined set of services to a defined
population group, such as the system of fundholding for general practitio-
ners (GPs) in the United Kingdom.31 Whether cream skimming will be
either a bigger or a smaller problem in a competitive provider market than
in a regulated competitive insurance market remains to be seen. On the one
hand, providers have more opportunities for cream skimming than insurers
do because they probably have better information about the riskiness of
their patients and because they can use more subtle tools (for example: “My
colleague around the comer is specialized in treating your disease”). On the
other hand, providers may be more reluctant to skim the cream because of
more powerful ethical restraints.
A long way from theory to practice. Although we are optimistic about
the technical possibilities to prevent cream skimming, the realization in
practice will require considerable effort. Both the Dutch and the British
governments have severely underestimated the problem of cream skimming
and, consequently, the need to develop sufficiently refined risk-adjusted
capitation payments. Insurers have always raised many critical questions
about risk-adjusted capitation payments and see them as an instrument by
which the government will get a stronger grip on the insurance business.
Experience with the AAPCC in the United States shows that, although
there is a large body of knowledge, the implementation of good risk-
adjusted capitation payments is a long way from theory to practice. Never-
theless, cream skimming truly is the Achilles’ heel of a wide range of
market-oriented strategies in health care that are being discussed and
implemented these days in many countries. Therefore, efforts aimed at the
prevention of cream skimming deserve a very high priority from both
researchers and policymakers.
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